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The Asian financial crisis, which is far from over as the latest news from Indonesia
confirm, has brought into the forefront four  aspects of  Asian growth that have important lessons
for South America which I will address today:
First, we have to recognize that there was indeed a “miracle” in growth rates in East Asia,
despite the arguments to the contrary; and that miracle had to do with the outward orientation
in trade of these economies;
Second, that trade orientation was characterised, not by any regional preferences or
Preferential Trade Agreements such as the FTAA that is now on the South American agenda, but
by nonregional worldwide orientation of the trade regimes;
Third, the role of industrial policy in that miracle was negligible at  the beginning of that
miracle, and in fact may well have turned counterproductive in the 1980s and recently, accounting
partly for the tremendous financial upheaval; and that
Fourth, the recent crisis holds cautionary lessons for, not outward trade orientation,
but for capital account convertibility and, equally, for significant reliance on short-term
borrowing.
A. Effect on  the World Economy
But before I turn to these themes, I must address an issue raised by the Organizers: what
is the likely impact of the Asian crisis on the world economy?
I am optimistic for the following reasons:
1. The deflationary effect from the affected Asian economies, in terms of income effects, cannot
be significant on OECD countries: the “locomotive theory” whereby Japan and Germany’s
expansion would pull US up was discredited in the 1980s, and the Asian economies are not
that powerful a locomotive either.
2. Japan has already had a sluggish, low-growth economy f r al ost 6 years; any
continuation or even accentuated decline would still be a small marginal deflationary influence.
3. US growth is not export-led but driven by domestic market and innovation, so the effect from
Asian slowdown in demand would in any event not be substantial.
4. As for falling prices of imports from Asia, the  robust US economy today is in the best
position to take advantage of these terms-of-trade improvement, and should grow faster
rather than slower: I predicted this on TV in January and it has been the case so far.
5. Contagion has not spread to other countries so far; it seems confined to those originally hit.
Reasons are many but sustainable, in my view.
6. There is little prospect of Protectionism for 2 reasons:
(i)  Thanks to the success of the Uruguay Round & earlier commitments, many tariffs are
“bound”; these bindings are close enough to actual tariff rates (except in agriculture) in
the developed countries, while the pressure from Asia is not in agricultural exports from
them.
(ii)  It is unlikely that many of the modern, multinational US firms that are likely to face Asian
competition will take the short view and go for broke on Anti-dumping actions,
especially as they also have interests in foreign markets that could retaliate tit-for-tat.
Also, VERs are now virtually outlawed at the WTO.
7.       So far, the OECD stock markets have held up pretty well, ev n rsing through new
barriers on Wall Street. With the US economy bvasically healthy, this is likely to continue.
B. Was there a “Miracle” in East Asia? Yes!!!
1. Yes, there was. First Larry Lau & then Allwyn Young estimated the growth of Total factor
Productivity in East Asia to be negligible. Drawing on Lau, T.N. Srinivasan(July 1993);  and
drawing on Young, Paul Krugman (November/December 1994), both argued that there was
no miracle in the sense that capital accumulation had driven the high growth rates.
2. But the miracle was precisely the immense investment rates, unprecedented in the history
of the world economy, virtually.
3. I explain this miracle of huge investment rates, with excellent productivity, in terms of the
high inducement to invest implied by the outward orientation. By contrast, the inward
orientation of an import-substitution country like India --- and surely many    countries of
South America in the days of Prebisch doctrines m--- meant that the inducement to invest was
limited by the domestic market.
4. In turn, the high export earnings enabled these countries to invest in imported capital
equipment with huge embodied technical change. I  addition, the high rates of literacy
and education meant that the productivity from the imported equipment was also extremely
high.
One final point: The latest empirical research, pe iodising the estimated TFP, shows what one
would expect to find: TFP grows in successive decades, as these economies mature
technologically. But that still leaves my basic explanation above intact.
C. Outward Orientation was Worldwide, Not Regional
1. The outward orientation in trade was not confined to regional trade. East Asia took the
whole world as its destination. This is its true contribution to the multilateral rading
system, quite aside from becoming a unique region that demonstrated the advantages to
developing countries of  integration into the world economy when most others were IS-
orineted in trade.
2. APEC also has followed this model, of  MFN-based regionalism, in contrast to the FTAA
which is Article 24-based and hence discriminatory.
3. The FTAA is a concept that fits more into South American history of  indulgence
towards preferences, whether IS (which is preference for oneself) or GSP (preferences for
developing countries). But, like those two, the FTA format is not an attractive one.
4. It is possible for South America still to turn away from the FTAA framework and into an
APEC mould, sticking to MFN as the sole basis for trade liberalization and pursuing
regionalism in several nontrade areas such as human rights, democracy, security etc.
5. MERCOSUR , if it aims at a Common Market like the EU, would be different in conception
and desirable relative to NAFTA or FTAA.  But it would make sense only if it adopts a truly
firm and time-bound program to actually deliver on a Common Market, not otherwise.
D. Industrial Policy Detracted from East Asian Growth
1. It is clear that Industrial Policy hurt South Korea, for example. As Ian Little noted long
ago, the returns to investment fell sharply in the 1980s when industrial policy shifted from
pushing labour-intensive goods in production and exports to investing in heavy industry,
semiconductors, shipbuilding etc.
2. So, the contention of Alice Amsden etc. that it was Industrial Policy that created the
East Asian miracle is not persuasive.
3. In Japan, on the other hand, the Industrial Policy was not a big problem because,
essentially, Mitsui and Mitsubishi controlled MITI rather than the other way around.
4. The essential point from the Lau-Young calculations should then be that th miracle was
really not due to some exceptional phenomenon like Confucianism or Industrial Policy,
but due to heavy investments which must be explained in turn as I have done earlier
today.
E. Cautionary Lessons: Trade Liberalization Excellent, but Watch Short-term
Borrowing
1. The current crisis does not prove that there was no miracle! Wh t happened was that
some of these economies opened up their financial sectors to permit reckless short-term
external borrowing which could not be managed when the crisis arose for different
reasons across the affected countries.
2. The correct lesson to draw is, not to withdraw from the world’s trade and equity investment
opportunities, but to ensure that short-term borrowing is carefully watched and kept within
reasonable bounds. In short, all globalization is not equally benign; some is like riding a tiger,
pleasurable but potentially fatal to your health. (See my Foreign Affairs , May/June 1998,
article on The Capital Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars.)
